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  In order to understand the reality of the constitutional review system, it would 
be necessary to analyze not merely the modalities of constitutional review by the 
judicial branch, but also the integrated government structure as a whole, while 
taking into account the function and practices of various prior check systems. 
  If the function of control of constitutionality is understood merely as ex-post 
review by the judicial court, it would lead to an impression that constitutional 
review is not always actively exercised in Japan and that the Supreme Court is 
not fully performing the function of constitutional review. However, regarding the 
Government bills which account for the majority of the bills submitted to the 
Diet, prior strict legal scrutiny on a bill by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is 
required. Moreover, the Diet member’s bills also receive a prior check by the 
Legislative Bureau of the House which is an assisting body. 
  Therefore, it would not be proper to criticize the practices of constitutional 
review by the Supreme Court as “judicial passivism” in the sense that it is not 
fully performing the function of constitutional review. Rather, it should be 
considered that there are few opportunities for invoking the ex-post review system 
effectively, because the prior constitutionality examination by the assisting bodies 
of the democratic institutions are effectively functioning. 
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** Professor, Kyoto University, Japan.
서울대학교 法學 제53권 제2호 2012년 6월 165∼185면
Seoul Law Journal Vol. 53 No. 2 June 2012. pp. 165∼185
166   서울대학교 法學 제53권 제2호 (2012. 6.)
I. Introduction
  (1) The major aims of my report on today’s theme are the following two 
points. First, I would like to examine the state of the Japanese judicial review 
system, and to further direct my attention to the function of the control of 
constitutionality in the democratic government structure as a whole as well as the 
issue of how such control should be secured.
  Secondly, I would like to demonstrate that there is another view possible, 
besides the prevailing view of “judicial passivism,” which is particularly given as 
criticism toward the practices of constitutional review by the Japanese Supreme 
Court, by directing my attention to the function of the control of constitutionality 
by the legislative bureaus which assist the Cabinet or Government and both 
Houses.
  (2) The term “judicial passivism” is used in the critical sense of not actively 
exercising the power of constitutional review, mainly based on the fact that the 
Supreme Court has rarely rendered judgments declaring laws and ordinances 
unconstitutional. For the system to control constitutionality by means of trials, 
Japan follows an American model of constitutional review by the judicial branch, 
rather than a German model of control of constitutionality by constitutional justice. 
Therefore, it may seem that Japan has had fewer judgments rendering the acts 
unconstitutional compared to the United States.
  However, it needs to be noted that there is a three-dimensional parallel review 
system particular to the federal system of the U.S., and that this is the reason for 
a large number of judgments rendering acts unconstitutional. That is, in the 
system collectively called judicial review, there are such three practices as (a) a 
review of state acts by the state courts, (b) a review of state acts by the federal 
courts, and (c) a review of acts of Congress by the federal courts.
  Among these, the system comparable to that of Japan is (c), which governs the 
relationship between the legislative branch and judicial branch on an equal footing, 
and which relates to 66 cases of judgments rendering acts unconstitutional during 
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the approximately 50-year period after the “Constitutional Revolution” of 1937 (up 
to 1988). This number is fewer than the 71 cases of judgments rendered during 
the approximately 30-year period before the “Constitutional Revolution.” During 
the approximately 200-year period after the enforcement of the Constitution of 
the United States, there have been as few as 139 judgments declaring acts 
unconstitutional, which include many judgments based on the notorious “doctrine 
of substantive due process.” Therefore, we should abstain from judging the stance 
of the Supreme Court by a simple numerical comparison.
II. Control of Constitutionality of Acts in the Democratic 
Government Structure
1. Function of Control of Constitutionality and Constitutional Review 
System
  (1) Under a democratic government structure which guarantees freedom of 
speech and suffrage, the issue of constitutionality of an act is normally scrutinized 
from an early stage of the legislative process. Particularly, in the case of 
legislation relating to the people’s rights and duties, the bill is often reported by 
the mass media, etc. from the stage of initial draft, creating controversy from 
diverse perspectives as to the purposes and effects of the legislation and questions 
on the wording of the bill. 
  Considering such a situation, the issue of constitutionality of an act should be 
discussed not only at the stage of ex-post constitutional review by the judicial 
branch, but also from the drafting stage prior to the legislation. In this sense, a 
person or organization involved in the legislative process, more or less, inevitably 
faces the question of constitutionality, and consequently will be required to assume 
some function of control of constitutionality, depending on their respective degree 
of commitment to the legislative process.
  In such case, the controlling body of the constitutionality varies with the 
constitutional regime. That is, under a presidential system in which only the 
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lawmakers are allowed to submit a bill, only the function of control of constitutionality 
by the Parliament has significance whereas, under a parliamentary cabinet system 
based on collaboration between the Cabinet and Parliament, these political 
branches share the functions and responsibilities for the control of constitutionality 
of legislation.
  On the other hand, the function of control of constitutionality to be performed 
after the enactment and enforcement of an act has been generally institutionalized 
as the ex-post review system by the court. The categories and methodologies of 
this system will be discussed later (see 3).
  (2) By focusing on the prior control of constitutionality by the political 
branches, apart from the ex-post review by the court, I do not intend to assert 
that these are equivalent even in terms of the levels of control, as the prior 
control of constitutionality by the political branches, even sometimes institutionalized 
(e.g. public hearing by Parliament), lacks both a stringent adversarial system and 
an argument process like those seen in the court trials.
  Nevertheless, if the control of constitutionality by the political branches can be 
implemented by the organization independent of the body responsible for drafting 
bills, such control function could be considerably effective and concentrated. 
2. Prior Control by the Political Branches
  (1) Firstly, looking at the legislative process at Parliament, when a lawmaker 
submits a bill, the assisting body is expected to perform the control the 
constitutionality of the bill, as long as the its early enactment is sought. Also, for 
the bills submitted by the Cabinet, control of constitutionality is expected to be 
implemented in the course of deliberation at a committee or a plenary session of 
Parliament. 
  There are some options for such assisting body that can effectively perform 
such function of control of constitutionality, such as individual legislative advisors 
and the parliamentary secretariat capable of systematic responses. In Japan, the 
Legislative Bureaus of the Houses have been newly established under the existing 
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Constitution, and have played the role of a powerful tool for the Diet members’ 
policy-making and bill-drafting.
  (2) On the other hand, in the countries adopting a parliamentary cabinet system, 
many bills are submitted to Parliament by Cabinets, and many of them are 
enacted through deliberation by Parliament. In this case, as mentioned above, 
control of constitutionality will be performed in the course of the deliberation at a 
committee or a plenary session of Parliament. However, considering that, under 
the parliamentary cabinet system, the majority in Parliament forms and maintains a 
Cabinet, there is the possibility that effective control of constitutionality in the 
deliberation process cannot be expected. 
  Therefore, what would be more important is to secure opportunities for control 
of constitutionality in the process of drafting a bill, or, more specifically, to create 
a framework enabling the assisting body involved in the process to perform the 
effective function of control. While there are various options for such body, in 
Japan, this duty has been delegated to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau which has a 
long history. 
3. Ex-post Review by the Court
  (1) Today, in general, as means to effectively secure the supremacy of the 
Constitution, various systems to review constitutionality of the acts have been put 
in place. From the perspective of comparative laws, these constitutional review 
systems are not harmonized in line with the same framework. These systems can 
be classified into the following types, depending on the aspect of the system to be 
focused on.
  1) When viewed from the aspect of the purposes of the review, the systems are 
roughly classified into the following two categories : (a) a continental European 
type, whose main purpose is to protect the Constitution, and (b) an 
American type, whose main purpose is to guarantee people’s rights (the 
guarantee of private rights).
  2) From the aspect of the methods of the review, the systems are often 
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classified into the following two categories : (a) a constitutional justice 
system and (b) a constitutional-law litigation system. “Constitutional justice” 
herein refers to a trial seeking determination based on the public authority 
by the special reviewing body generally called the “constitutional court” as 
to the constitutionality of the acts. For this type of trial, decisions as to the 
constitutionality of acts are shown in the main text of judgments. In contrast, 
“constitutional-law litigation” refers to litigation in which the judicial court, 
whose purpose is to adjudicate concrete litigation cases, renders judgments 
on the constitutionality of the applicable laws involved in adjudicating the 
case. For this type of trial, decisions as to whether the act is constitutional 
are presented in the ratio decidendi.
  3) When viewed from the aspect of the timing of review, the system can be 
also classified into the following two categories : (a) prior review to be 
conducted before the enforcement of acts, and (b) ex-post review to be 
conducted after the enforcement of the acts. The representative example of 
the prior review system is the one adopted by the Constitutional Council of 
France. However, as is well known, France also has introduced the ex-post 
review system by the recent amendment to the Constitution.
  4) From the aspect of the reviewing body, the systems can be contrasted as 
follows : (a) centralized-type, with the judicial supreme court or special 
constitutional court having the exclusive reviewing authority, and (b) a 
decentralized/distributed-type, with the lower courts and other courts also 
having the authority to determine the constitutionality. 
  (2) The categorization into concrete review and abstract review is often 
suggested based on the comparison between the American type and German type. 
However, even under the constitutional-law litigation system, constitutional review 
is occasionally made in the course of an objective lawsuit whereas, even under 
the abstract review system, most of the cases of objections of unconstitutionality 
have been triggered by a concrete dispute case.
  Therefore, it must be said that such contrastive categorization is a considerably 
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misleading understanding of the systems. Even if the term “abstract review 
system” is to be used, it should be reserved for the traditional Constitutional 
Council of France, which has performed a constitutional review prior to the final 
enactment of an act.
III. Dual System of Control of Constitutionality of Acts in Japan
1. Government Bill and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau
  (1) In the case of a Government bill, in general, the section (unit of administrative 
activities) of the ministries and agencies having jurisdiction over the area covered 
by the bill drafts the bill, after seeking the opinions and intentions of various 
sectors and studying domestic and foreign literature. Then, after the internal 
discussion within the ministry, the bill is referred to the conference of relevant 
ministries. Therefore, the function of control of constitutionality may be performed 
in the process of such ministerial or cross-ministerial discussions. 
  However, as the examination function at this stage is merely the internal 
administrative procedure, it cannot be understood to provide the function of 
control of constitutionality by the external body. The control function in this 
context can be expected to be performed by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, 
which will be further discussed below.
  First, regarding the position of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, it should be 
noted that it is an assisting body subordinated to the Government, but is a highly 
independent professional organization supported by its unique staffing system and 
the authority established since the Meiji period. 
  The examination by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is the procedure required 
under the law. The legal basis for this requirement is Article 3, paragraph (1) of 
the Act for Establishment of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau which reads as 
follows : “to examine the drafts of bills, cabinet orders and treaties to be referred 
to the Cabinet meeting, and to submit them to the Cabinet with the opinions and 
necessary revisions.”
172   서울대학교 法學 제53권 제2호 (2012. 6.)
  Regarding the method of examination by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, it is 
said to “examine if the bill stipulates so-called legal matters,” while particularly 
taking into consideration the following points : 1) that the bill is consistent with 
the court precedents, practices, major academic theories, etc., in addition to the 
current system of laws headed by the Constitution, 2) that the purpose of the bill 
is to realize the philosophy of the Constitution, such as respect of individuals and 
promotion of public welfare, 3) that the bill is reasonable and appropriate as the 
legal norm, i.e. that it is in line with the purpose of legislation, fair and effective, 
and is reasonably expected to be deferred to and complied with in the relevant 
area by the nationals. 
  (2) Here, the expressions “constitution” and “philosophy of the constitution” 
imply the control of constitutionality of the bill. The following remark made by a 
lawyer who was involved in the Diet member’s bill also infers the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau’s function of control of constitutionality through the examination 
of bills. 
  There is no such organization as the Cabinet Legislation Bureau in the U.S., so 
a Congress member, on his/her initiative, can submit the bill relatively freely. The 
U.S. deserves to use the term “separation of powers,” as the powers are separated 
such that the Congress is dedicated to lawmaking and the court to the determination 
of constitutionality of the acts. Contrary to this, in Japan, the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau which examines the Cabinet bills plays the role of a so-called secondary 
Supreme Court, and the bills are scrutinized based on the perfectionism in 
assuring the consistency with the system of laws headed by the Constitution.
  A person who formerly worked for the Legislative Bureau of the House also 
has given a similar comment. According to this comment, firstly, an important 
point to be checked in the Cabinet Legislation Bureau’s examination is to secure 
logical consistency within the system of laws headed by the Constitution, that is, 
constitutionality examination of a bill. In addition, according to this comment, the 
government’s right of interpretation of the Constitution is virtually in the hands of 
the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, and its constitutionality examination which covers 
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all the Government bills are characterized by the following facts : 1) that it is 
implemented prior to drafting a bill, 2) that most of the bills submitted to the 
Diet comprise Government bills, and 3) that it is implemented in a considerably 
strict manner therefore, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau’s function to secure 
constitutionality of a bill is much larger than that of the Supreme Court vested 
with the power of constitutional review.
  The Cabinet Legislation Bureau examines about 500∼600 affaires per year on 
average, including the drafts of Government bills and cabinet ordinances. In 
particular, the draft Government bill prepared by each ministry and agency 
undergoes strict examination, from the perspective of constitutionality such as the 
effect on people’s rights and obligations or the consistency with the whole of 
legal systems. Given this, it would be a natural consequence that in Japan, the 
court would declare the Government-intiated Acts unconstitutional less frequently 
compared to the U.S. and other countries.
2. Diet member’s Bills and Legislative Bureaus of the Houses
  (1) Meanwhile, the legal basis for the Legislative Bureau of the House services 
relating to drafting and examination of acts is Article 131 of the Diet Act which 
reads as follows : “to assist Diet Members in drafting bills.” It is controversial 
whether the Legislative Bureau of the House is required to provide the assistance 
in relation to the lawmaker-initiated bills. However, this issue will be discussed 
later (see (2) below).
  Generally speaking, the points of attention for the examination of the contents 
in the process of the Legislative Bureau of the House’s examination through the 
drafting of Diet member’s bills are said to be as follows : (i) whether it is 
appropriate to stipulate such contents by the Act; (ii) whether it is feasible if it is 
stipulated by the Act; (iii) compliance with the constitution; (iv) consistency with 
the principle of respect of individual’s personalities and welfare for the entire 
society; (v) whether the bill results in unjustified interference by the public 
authorities; and (vi) whether the bill runs counter to the existing related legal 
systems.
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  Thus, whenever the Legislative Bureau of the House codifies the legislative 
concept of the Diet Member, it checks whether the scheme of new legislation 
conceived by each Diet member would be compatible with the existing whole of 
legal orders and legal theories. In addition, it is said that the Legislative Bureau 
of the House in some cases makes recommendation to amend the proposal or 
withdraw the proposal itself, and that the most important perspective for such 
recommendation-making is whether the proposed legislative concept is constitutional 
(constitutionality examination). As a consequence, the Legislative Bureau of the 
House’s function of control of constitutionality is inferred in this context.
  (2) The issue involved here is the position of the Legislative Bureau of the 
House, as already mentioned above. Some authors say that the right to submit the 
bill is the most fundamental right of Diet members, and that the provisions and 
practices which would be obstacle sin exercising this right should be lifted. In 
other words, such authors say that the appropriateness of the contents of bill is 
the issue to be ultimately determined by the voters, not by the factions or 
institutions of the Houses, and that even supposing that the bill contradicts the 
Constitution, it would be appropriate to refer the issue to the ex-post review by 
the judicial branch.
  On the other hand, other authors argue that the Legislative Bureau of the House 
has a function to check the proposed legislation from the perspective of legal 
theories, and also from the perspective of policy measures if necessary, instead of 
drafting the bill only from the perspective of legislative techniques. However, even 
such authors assert that the acts adopted by the Houses or Diet member’s bill 
concept can only be restrained by a considerably high-level and independent state 
organization, and that the Legislative Bureau of the House by no means has the 
power to refuse the bill on the ground of its unconstitutionality. 
  As mentioned above, in theory, the Diet member’s right to propose the bill is 
considered to supersede in relation to the Legislative Bureau’s examination 
function; however, in practice, this is not always the case. According to some 
practitioners, in practice, the secretariats of both Houses would not accept any bill 
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prepared without legislative assistance of the Legislative Bureau of the House, 
although the law allows a Diet Member to propose (submit) a bill without such 
assistance.
3. Ex-post Review by the Judicial Branch
  (1) Under the current Constitution of Japan, the jurisdiction of the state is 
unified, in the sense that the judicial power exclusively belongs to the court 
organizations headed by the Supreme Court. That is, under the existing Constitution, 
a diversified trial system consisting of judicial trial, administrative trial, constitutional 
justice, etc., which is generally adopted by the continental European countries, is 
not adopted in Japan.
  The power of the judicial courts, in its nature, is to adjudicate legal disputes. 
At the same time, the current Constitution adopts a system in which the judicial 
court, if the case involves the issue of constitutionality of the applicable legislative 
act (i.e. law), also determines such issue. Such system of review of unconstitutional 
legislation by the judicial branch was established in the U.S., and is called 
“judicial review.” Article 81 of the Constitution of Japan clearly indicates that it 
adopts a system of constitutional review, stipulating as follows : “The Supreme 
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of 
any act, order, regulation or official act.”
  (2) However, there has been a controversy between the two theories as to the 
interpretation of the nature of this provision. The contrasts between these two 
theories largely correspond to the two types of review system, i.e. constitutional 
justice and constitutional-law litigation, as explained thus far. The first theory 
interprets that under the Constitution, it is possible, depending on the content of 
the legislative measures, to give the Supreme Court a function of the constitutional 
court as seen in the continental European laws, and that independent constitutional 
review is possible; whereas the second theory interprets that, taking into account 
the process of adoption of the Constitution effected by the U.S. Constitution, the 
Supreme Court was envisioned as the “court of last resort” of the judicial court 
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which adjudicates legal disputes, and that only collateral constitutional review is 
possible under the Constitution.
  In this regard, the Supreme Court earlier showed the understanding that Article 
81 of the Constitution of Japan is “the express stipulation of the power of 
constitutional review established as the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution” 
(Judgment of the full bench on July 8, 1948). Further, the Supreme Court, in the 
later Police Reserve Force Case, held that the court “cannot exercise the power of 
making abstract judgment on the controversies or disputes which may arise from 
the interpretation of the Constitution or other acts and orders, without the concrete 
legal action having been instituted.” (Judgment of the full bench on October 8, 
1952). Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the constitutional review 
system should be implemented as the collateral review system (constitutional-law 
litigation), that is, a judicial review of American type.
  (3) When discussing such constitutional review system in Japan, the issue of 
substantive criteria for constitutional review which indicate the level of control of 
constitutionality and the issue of procedural control are discussed in considerable 
depth, in addition to the issues of the operational framework for judicial review 
such as the doctrine of necessity, rule of avoidance of constitutional issues, rule 
of avoidance of judgment of unconstitutionality (rule of constitutional 
interpretation), legislative fact, and review of purposes and means.
  However, this report only points out the following characteristics, for reason of 
lack of sufficient time to discuss these issues. Firstly, it should be noted that the 
lower courts (district court, high court, etc.), which generally examines litigation 
cases, also can perform constitutional review. That is, Article 81 of the Constitution 
of Japan is interpreted to grant the power to determine constitutionality to the 
lower courts as well, because the Supreme Court stands as the top of the 
hierarchy of the judicial court system based on the tiered trial system. Therefore, 
in relation to the aforementioned types of “ex-post review by the court” (see II 3), 
the constitutional review system of Japan could be classified as the “decentralized/ 
distributed-type constitutional review.”
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  Secondly, the ultimate review of the constitutionality is conducted by the 
Supreme Court which is the final appellate court, and there are some institutional 
frameworks as follows, in relation to the modalities of trial by the Supreme Court.
  (i) In principle, it is up to the discretion of the Supreme Court to decide 
whether the case should be adjudicated by the full bench or petty bench 
however, if any of the following applies, the case must be adjudicated by 
the full bench : (a) a judgment on a question of Constitution is to be made 
for the first time, (b) a judgment of violation of Constitution is to be made, 
or (c) the case law is to be changed (Article 10 of the Court Act).
  (ii) In addition, the Supreme Court, based on its rule-making power to adopt 
the judicial procedures (Article 77 of the Constitution), provides that the 
case shall be examined by the full bench if any of the following applies: 
(d) when the opinions of the petty bench are divided into two of the same 
number of opinions, or (e) the presiding judge of the petty bench 
determines the adjudication by the full bench to be appropriate (Article 9, 
paragraph (2) of the Supreme Court Business Handling Procedures).
(iii) When the case is to be examined by the full bench, the full bench may 
also limit its examination and adjudication on a particular question, 
especially the question of constitutionality. The examination of the case by 
the petty bench is conducted based on this premise. (Article 9, paragraphs 
(3) and (4) of the Supreme Court Business Handling Procedures). In reality, 
there have been many cases in which the point at issue was referred to and 
examined by the grand bench. In both cases, important judgments have 
been made.
4. Practices of Judicial Review
  (1) During the approximately 64-year’s period to date since the enforcement of 
the Constitution of Japan, there have not been so many cases where the statutory 
provision at issue was judged unconstitutional. There have been only eight cases 
in which the grand bench of the Supreme Court made such judgments, which are 
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described below.
  1) The judgment dated on April 4, 1973, which judged that Article 200 of the 
Criminal Code stipulating a heavier punishment for a parricide murder was 
against the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution 
(Parricide Murder Case).
  2) The judgment dated on April 30, 1975, which judged that Article 6, paragraphs 
(2) and (4) of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act stipulating the restriction on 
locations for the licensing standards for the establishment of pharmacies 
infringed the freedom to choose occupation stipulated in Article 22 of the 
Constitution (Pharmaceutical Affairs Act Case).
  3) The judgment dated April 14, 1976, which judged that Schedule No. 1 of 
the Public Offices Election Act stipulating the assignment of number of seats 
of members of the House of Representatives under a so-called medium 
constituency system (the number of seats was 491), was against the principle 
of equal election in Article 14 of the Constitution (House of Representatives 
Seats Case).
  4) The judgment dated July 17, 1985, which judged that Schedule No. 1 of the 
Public Offices Election Act, stipulating the assignment of seats of members 
of the House of Representatives under a medium constituency system (the 
number of seats was 511), was against the principle of equality (House of 
Representatives Seats Case).
  5) The judgment dated April 22, 1987, which judged that Article 186 of the 
Forest Act not allowing the division of a shared forest was against the 
guarantee of property rights under Article 29 of the Constitution (Forest Act 
Case).
  6) The judgment dated September 11, 2002, which judged that the provisions of 
Articles 68 and 73 of the Postal Act limiting the scope of compensation for 
damages relating to certain postal items violated Article 17 of the Constitution 
which guarantees the right of claim for state compensation (Postal Act Case).
  7) The judgment dated September 14, 2005, which judged that Paragraph 8 of 
the Supplementary Provision of the Public Offices Election Act, which had 
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limited the right to vote of expatriate Japanese nationals in elections of 
proportional representatives for both Houses, was against universal suffrage 
which guarantees an opportunity to vote (Expatriate Voting Rights Suit).
  8) The judgment dated June 4, 2008, which judged that the requirements for 
legitimation stipulated in Article 3, Paragraph (1) of the Nationality Act was 
against the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution, in that 
an irrational distinction was established between a legitimate and illegitimate 
child (Nationality Act Case).
  For most of the provisions judged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, after 
the administrative circular notices ordering the suspension of the enforcement of 
such act are issued, the legislative branch responds by adopting the draft revised 
act submitted by the Cabinet to effect deletion or amendment of the relevant 
provision. From the standpoint that the judicial branch, as a body in charge of 
state governing process along with the legislative and administrative branches, 
plays a role in policy making, namely, formation of the constitutional order, 
through their mutual relationship and interactions, such response is evidence of a 
desirable corresponding relationship between the political branch and judicial 
branch.
  On the other hand, in the case of the schedule of the Public Offices Election 
Act, the political impact was massive, because the provision to be amended 
involved a change in the number of seats of Houses. Moreover, while the 
Supreme Court judged the national election executed based on such number of 
seats to be illegal, it also directed that the validity of the election should be 
maintained, based on the special consideration by way of the application of the 
“general principles of law.” Thus, this case mirrors the difficulty of the judicial 
court’s intervention in the political process. 
  (2) Besides the above eight cases, there are four cases in which the provisions 
of the Public Offices Election Act relating to the apportionment of House 
members were judged to be in an “unconstitutional state.” It is true that the 
Supreme Court has rarely judged acts unconstitutional, even adding such four 
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cases. Regarding this point, there has been the criticism as stated in the beginning 
that the Supreme Court resorts to “judicial passivism” and refrains from actively 
exercising its power of constitutional review.
  However, I would consider such evaluation to be inappropriate, and that proper 
analysis of this situation calls for comprehensive assessment in the context of the 
entire democratic government structure surrounding the power of constitutional 
review by the Supreme Court (Here, the two judgment cases rendering the actions 
of local government unconstitutional, and some Supreme Court judgments 
rendering the municipal ordinances constitutional based on limited interpretation 
are not taken into account.).
  First, as explained in detail above, it is also necessary to consider the significance 
and function of the prior control of constitutionality by the Legislative Bureau of 
the House and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. Therefore, it is not proper to 
evaluate the stance of the Supreme Court, focusing only on the number of 
judgments rendering the acts unconstitutional as a result.
  Second, even when viewed from the aspect of the number of cases, it should 
be firstly noted that, in addition to the abovementioned four cases relating to the 
apportionment of House members where the Court judged the provision to be in 
an “unconstitutional state,” there are also many grand bench judgments which 
maintained the validity of provisions of an act with certain conditions and 
qualifications, i.e. by way of a limited interpretation of the meaning of the articles 
of act in issue in accordance with the so-called principles of constitution-conformable 
interpretation (in German, Verfassungskonforme Auslegung), although the Court 
did not hold the relevant provisions to be unconstitutional. (For example, Bona 
Fide Third Party Property Confiscation Case (judgment dated November 27, 1957), 
Third Party Property Confiscation Case (judgment dated November 28, 1962), and 
Tokyo Teachers’ Union Case (judgment dated April 2, 1969)).
  Moreover, even in such cases, new legislative measures in keeping with the 
purports of the judgment have often been taken. For example, the “Act on 
Emergency Measures on Criminal Procedure to Confiscate Items Owned by Third 
Parties” was enacted half a year later after the judgment of the Third Party 
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Property Confiscation Case. This indicates the desirable corresponding relationship 
between the political branch and judicial branch as mentioned earlier.
IV. Conclusion or Summary
  (1) Firstly, the afore-mentioned points will be summarized as follows. If the 
function of control of constitutionality is understood merely as ex-post review by 
the judicial court, it would lead to an impression that constitutional review is not 
always actively exercised in Japan and that the Supreme Court is not fully 
performing the function of constitutional review.
  However, regarding the Government bills which account for the majority of the 
bills submitted to the Diet, prior strict legal scrutiny on a bill by the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau is required. Moreover, the Diet member’s bills also receive a 
prior check by the Legislative Bureau of the House which is an assisting body. This 
is the reason why I entitled my report “Dual System of Control of Constitutionality.”
  Therefore, it would not be proper to criticize the practices of constitutional 
review by the Supreme Court as “judicial passivism” in the sense that it is not 
fully performing the function of constitutional review. Rather, it should be 
considered that there are few opportunities for invoking the ex-post review system 
effectively, because the prior constitutionality examination by the assisting bodies 
of the democratic institutions are effectively functioning. 
  Thus, in order to understand the reality of the constitutional review system, it 
would be necessary to analyze not merely the modalities of constitutional review 
by the judicial branch, but also the integrated government structure as a whole, 
while taking into account the function and practices of various prior check systems.
  Furthermore, from the perspective of protection of rights of people in particular, 
it would be necessary, as a matter of course, to secure an ex-post remedy against 
the infringement of rights and interests of people. Rather, it should also be noted 
that an enhanced effective prior check would be the stronger tool for the effective 
protection of people’s rights and interests.
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  (2) Given the necessity and significance of analysis of the function of control 
of constitutionality in the context of the entire government structure, we will face 
other issues, including the issues as to whether the constitutional democracies of 
Asian and western European countries also have systems of prior control of 
constitutionality by the assisting body of Parliament or the Government, which are 
equivalent to the Legislative Bureau of the House or Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
of Japan, and if so, the issue of how effectively such systems are functioning.
  In this context, I have been paying attention to the function of the Ministry of 
Government Legislation of South Korea, which is subordinated to the Prime 
Minister and has over 200 staff members. This ministry reportedly checks the 
drafts of ministerial orders which is equivalent to the Japanese ministerial 
ordinances, in addition to the drafts of government bills, treaties and the Prime 
Minister’s order to be submitted to the Cabinet, as well as the power of 
administrative trial. 
  My interest here is, of course, the issue of whether such ministry is effectively 
performing the function of control of constitutionality as discussed in this report. I 
would like to conclude my report, expecting to acquire insight on this question on 
this opportunity.
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Article 76. (1) The whole judicial 
power is vested in a Supreme Court 
and in such inferior courts as are 
established by law.
 (3) All judges shall be independent 
in the exercise of their conscience 
and shall be bound only by this 
Constitutuion and the laws.
Article 77.  (1) The Supreme Court is 
vested with the rule-making power 
under which it determines the rules 
of procedure and of practice, and of 
matters relating to attorneys, the 
internal discipline of the courts and 
the administration of judicial affairs.
Article 81.  The Supreme Court is the 
court of last resort with power to 
determine the constitutionality of any 
law, order, regulation or official act.
Article 98.  (1) This Constitution shall 
be the supreme law of the nation 
and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript 
or other act of government, or part 
thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, 
shall have legal force or validity.
DIET LAW
Chapter XVII. National Diet 
Library, Legislative Bureau, 
Secretaries to Members and 
Members’ Office Buildings
Article 131.  (1) A Legislative Bureau 
shall be established in each House to 
assist Diet Members in drafting bills.
 (2) Each Legislative Bureau shall have 
one Commissioner General, secretaries 
and other necessary personnel.
 (3) The Commissioner General of the 
Legislative Bureau shall be appointed 
and dismissed by the presiding officer 
with the approval of the House, 
provided that, when the Diet is out 
of session, the presiding officer may 
accept the resignation of the Commissioner 
General of the Bureau.
 (4) The Commissioner General of the 
Legislative Bureau shall administer 
of the business of the Legislative 
Bureau under the supervision of the 
presiding officer.
 (5) The secretaries and other 
personnel of the Legislative Bureau 
shall be appointed and dismissed by 
the Commissioner General, with the 
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consent of the presiding officer and 
the approval of the Committee on 
Rules and Administration.
 (6) The secretaries of the Legislative 
Bureau shall work under the direction 
of the Commissioner General.
COURT ACT
Article 3.  (1) Courts shall, except as 
specifically provided for in the 
Constitution of Japan, decide all legal 
disputes, and have such other powers 
as are specifically provided for by 
law.
Article 5.  (1) The justices of the Supreme 
Court shall comprise the chief justice, 
who is called the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, and other justices, 
who are called Justices of the Supreme 
Court.
 (3) The number of Justices of the 
Supreme Court shall be fourteen and 
the number of judges of lower courts 
shall be determined by law separately.
Article 10.  Regulations of the Supreme 
Court shall determine which cases 
are to be handled by full bench and 
which by petty bench; provided, 
however, that in the following instances, 
a petty bench may not give a 
judicial decision
 (i) Cases in which a determination is 
to be made on the constitutionality 
of law, order, rule, or disposition, based 
on the argument by a party (except 
the cases where the opinion is the 
same as that of the judicial decision 
previously rendered through the full 
bench in which the constitutionality 
of act, order, rule, or disposition is 
recognized).
 (ii) Cases other than those referred 
to in the preceding item when any 
law, order, rule, or disposition is to 
be decided as unconstitutional.
 (iii) Cases where an opinion concerning 
interpretation and application of the 
Constitution or of any other laws 
and regulations is contrary to that of 
a judicial decision previously rendered 
by the Supreme Court.
ACT FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF 
CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU
Article 1.  (Establishment)  The Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau shall be established 
within in the Cabinet.
Article 3.  (Affairs under Jurisdiction) 
The Cabinet Legislation Bureau shall 
administer the following affairs:
 (i) To examine the drafts of bills, 
cabinet orders and treaties to be 
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referred to the Cabinet meeting, and 
to submit them to the Cabinet with 
opinions and the necessary revisions.
 (ii) To prepare drafts of bills and 
cabinet orders, and to submit them 
to the Cabinet.
 (iii) To provide opinions on legal issues
to the Cabinet, Prime Minister  and 
the Ministers. 
 (iv) To conduct research and studies 
on domestic, foreign and international 
legislations and their operations.
 (v) Other affairs relating to the 
legislations in general.
